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Recently, social scientists have made significant progress in
understanding the use of language in social situations. Research
has been done on language use in elementary school classrooms,
psychotherapy sessions, interviews, and service encounters, to men-
tion only a few examples.' Contributions have come not only from
linguists, as might be expected, but also from anthropologists, psy-
chologists, sociologists, and others. This growing research is part
of the well-established interdisciplinary field known as sociolin-
guistics that is concerned generally with the role of language in
society.
This burgeoning interest in language usage has led researchers
in the area of sociology known as ethnomethodology 2 to begin to
study verbal interaction in courtroom settings.3 Because ethno-
f Associate Professor of Anthropology, Oberlin College. B.S. 1964, University
of Illinois; MA. 1967, Ph.D. 1972, Stanford University.
I See, e.g., W. LAsov & D. FANs=., TuzAmrEurc DiscouRsE: PSYCHO-
• ERAPY AS CONVERSAMON (1977); McHoul, The Organization of Turns at Formal
Talk in the Classroom, 7 LANGUAcE 3x Soc'y 183 (1978); Merritt, On Questions
Following Questions in Service Encounters, 5 LANGUAGE inr Soc'y 315 (1976);
Wolfson, Speech Events and Natural Speech: Some Implications for Sociolinguistic
Methodology, 5 LANGUAGE Ire Sod'y 189 (1976).
2 Etbnomethodology diverges from traditional sociology in emphasizing how a
particular social order is perceived and managed by those participating in it,
rather than attempting to deduce rational principles explaining and predicting why
certain events occur. Unlike traditional sociology, ethnomethodology relies on,
rather than discredits, the descriptions of social processes by those most affected by
them. Consequently, Its research methods frequently approach those participant
observation strategies employed by anthropologists. For a more detailed ex-
planation than this necessarily abbreviated description, see J. ATmNSON & P. DREw,
ORm ni Commr 18-33 (1979); H. GARs'nqEI, STUms iN ETNOMEMODOLOGY
(1967).
S Atkinson and Drew also note that
law, or at least jurisprudence, has not remained isolated from this growing
interest in language use, the major contribution of H.L.A. Hart (espe-
dally [The Concept of Law]) having been to update jurisprudence by
locating it within the tradition of ordinary language philosophy. But law
and philosophy are disciplines without a tradition of empirical research
and, even though these recent developments can be read as proposing the
study of speech practices as one way forward ... , jurisprudence appears
to have responded in more predictable ways to the insights of Hart,
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methodologists have made the major contributions to the the study
of everyday conversation, the most informal and complex form of
language usage, it should be of more than passing interest that
preliminary results of ethnomethodological studies of court hearings
have become available in J. Maxwell Atkinson and Paul Drew's
book, Order in Court.
The aim of the research reported by Atkinson and Drew, as
they point out in their initial chapter, differs significantly from pre-
vious studies of language behavior in the courtroom. It is not
assumed in this research that the language used in court facilitates
legal decisionmaking because it is more specific and standardized
than the language of everyday conversation. 4 Nor is it assumed
that courtroom language is an esoteric code poorly understood by
persons subjected to legal procedures and therefore used by judicial
and court officials to coerce and manipulate them.5 Atkinson and
Drew argue that to make either of these assumptions is to presup-
pose what has never been carefully studied-how verbal interac-
tion is actually organized in courtroom settings and how this kind of
language use relates to language use in conversation. They argue
that whether courtroom language facilitates or disguises what takes
place in court hearings will remain only a matter of opinion until
it has been determined empirically just exactly how language usage
in the courtroom is organized."
The aim of Atkinson and Drew's research is to elucidate this
organization of verbal interaction in court hearings. Their intent
is not simply to characterize properties of the language used in
legal proceedings, such as the frequency with which attorneys use
certain words or grammatical constructions in questioning witnesses
and defendants; 7 rather, their interest is in the actions and order
that are achieved in court hearings by participants through their
verbal behavior. In the judicial setting, many crucial actions are
accomplished and coordinated through talk: jurors are sworn in,
witnesses testify, attorneys state objections to questions of opposing
counsel, judges instruct juries, and defendants are pronounced guilty
or innocent. The focus of attention in this research is not simply
preferring to remain faithful to its traditional abstract interest in the nature
of rules, rights, [and] obligations.
J. AT rNsoN & P. DnEw, supra note 2, at 5 (footnote and citation omitted).
41d. 7-8.
5 Id. 13.
OId. 14-18.
7 Simplistic and generally uninteresting research of this type has also been
done. See, e.g., Conley, O'Barr & Lind, The Power of Language: Presentational
Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DuxE L. REv. 1375.
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on what people say when they talk in court, but on what they do
when they talk in court."
As a body, the rules of legal "conversation" demarcate and
dignify a judicial event. They "ensure the reasonable safety of the
decisions of the courts, by aiding the collection of relevant and im-
partial evidence and the assessment of its validity." 9 Unquestion-
ably, these rules are as effective in identifying a situation as "judi-
cial" as are the physical attributes of a courtroom.
Yet one need look only as far as administrative agency pro-
ceedings to be reminded that lawyers sometimes employ rules of
verbal exchange that more closely approximate rules of ordinary
talk than courtroom rules. A set of relaxed verbal rules was im-
plemented because the functions and goals of such agencies are per-
ceived differently than are those of traditional courts. The ques-
tion may then be asked whether all the rules of courtroom exchange
are necessary to achieve the goals-perceived or real- of the judicial
process. The type of research begun by this book may aid in the
identification of those features of the judicial process that contribute
little, or not at all, to the attainment of the goals of that process.
Such a study should at least shed light on the simultaneously
maligned and praised phenomenon of courtroom language. Atkin-
son and Drew confront the notion, urged by many lawyers and some
laypeople, that language in court is of necessity formal and technical,
as well as the challenge, offered by many laypeople and some
lawyers, that such language is unnecessary and alienating.1
Although neither contradictory assumption-that language
used in court either facilitates or disguises what is being done-has
yet been systematically verified, the correllative assumption that con-
trasts courtroom talk and conversation is not at all inappropriate
S This point has been thoroughly explored by ordinary language philosophers
in their studies of speech act pragmatics; the seminal impetus for this line of
research was provided by J. AusmN, How To Do TINs WrIT WoRDs (1962).
9J. ATEINsoN & P. DREw, supra note 2, at 34.
l0The authors quote the words of Henry W. Taft (brother of the Chief
Justice and a prominent lawyer):
Counsel and court find it necessary through examination and instruction
to induce a witness to abandon for an hour or two his habitual method
of thought and expression, and conform to the rigid ceremonialism of
court procedure. It is not strange that frequently truthful witnesses are
misunderstood, that they react nervously in such a way as to create
the impression that they are either evading or intentionally falsifying.
Id. 236 (quoting H. TAFT, WITNSSES IN COURT (1934), quoted in J. FRANK,
CoufTs ON TRn 81 (1949)).
The authors also describe attempts to "humanize" the settings of Swedish
cdurts to make them less intimidating for participants and "as much like seminars
as possible." Id. 233 (footnote omitted).
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or misdirected. Indeed, as Atkinson and Drew demonstrate, a con-
trastive investigation of verbal interaction in conversation and in
court hearings can aid in characterizing the organization of lan-
guage usage in judicial settings. As mentioned at the outset, con-
versation is the best understood form of speech exchange, thanks
largely to the efforts of a group of investigators who have developed
"conversational analysis" as a special research topic within the field
of ethnomethodology. 1' Atkinson and Drew follow the suggestion
of conversational analysts that, because conversation is the most
basic speech exchange system, other speech exchange systems should
be studied in comparison with conversation. Atkinson and Drew
use conversational analysis to study the organization of both direct
and cross-examination of witnesses, the types of courtroom speech
exchange most extensively analyzed in their book. This review
aims to convey something of the nature of Atkinson and Drew's
studies of examination. It begins with a brief sketch of the or-
ganization of conversation and then considers several aspects of the
organization of examination in enough detail to illustrate both the
interest and significance of Atkinson and Drew's research.
ORGANIZATION OF CONVERSATION
Participants in conversation engage in talk in an orderly
fashion. They take turns at talking organized in terms of the
following simple set of rules:
(1) For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place (the
point at which the unit of talk-word, phrase, clause, or sen-
tence-is completed):
(a) The current speaker may select the next speaker, who
thereby becomes the only person with the right and the
duty to take the next turn. If this happens, a turn trans-
fer is effected.
(b) If the current speaker does not select the next speaker,
then another party may select himself or herself to be the
11 See Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, A Simplest Systematics for the Organization
of Turn-Taking for Conversation, 50 LANcUAGE 696 (1974); Sacks, An Initial
Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology, in
STuDnwS IN SocuLmx INBAcnoN 31 (D. Sudnow ed. 1972); Sacks, On the
Analyzability of Stories by Children, in DnEcTIONS IN S00IOL.,INGISTICS 325 (J.
Gumperz & D. Hymes eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Analyzability of Stories];
Schegloff & Sacks, Opening Up Closings, 8 SmetsoncA 289 (1973); Schegloff,
Sequencing in Conversational Openings, in DstcnToNs IN Socboirucxsncs 346
(J. Gumperz & D. Hymes eds. 1972); Schegloff, Notes on a Conversational
Practice: Formulating Place, in S~nmhs IN SocrAL INTERAcTIoN 75 (D. Sudnow
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Conversational Practice].
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next speaker by being the first person to start an utterance
at the transition place. If this happens, a turn transfer is
effected.
(c) If the current speaker does not select the next speaker
and there is no self-selection, then the current speaker
may continue. If this happens, a turn transfer is not
effected.
(2) When a turn transfer does not occur and the current
speaker continues, the above rule set reapplies at successive
transition-relevance places until a turn transfer does occur.12
Conversations, accomplished in accord with this turn-taking
system, have several important characteristics. 13 First, an obvious
characteristic of conversational interactions is that one party talks
at a time. Although this may not be surprising, it is nontrivial
because it need not be the case (and is not the case in other speech
exchange systems) that single speakers talk in single turns and that
examples of more than one speaker talking simultaneously occur
almost exclusively at transition-relevance places. Second, the size
of turns is not fixed-some are filled with only a word; others with
a phrase, a clause, or a sentence. Further, the length of a conversa-
tion is not determined in advance; rather, participants must close
conversations by applying special closing procedures. 4 Fourth, the
number of participants in a conversation varies: two participants
are, of course, a minimum; as the number of participants increases
to four or more, the tendency is for the conversation to fission into
two or more conversations. Fifth, the order of turns is locally
managed-one turn is allocated at a time and there are options at
each transition point. Finally, the content of a turn (what is said
and done) is not specified beforehand (as it is in debates, for ex-
ample, where the pro and con sides are preallocated turns for re-
buttal and counterrebuttal).
Notwithstanding this last characteristic, what may be done in
some turns is constrained by "adjacency pairs." These are paired
utterances that are used to accomplish paired actions. When a first
pair part (for example, a greeting or a question) is produced by a
first speaker, a second pair part (a return greeting or an answer)
is expected from a second speaker and, when it is produced, dis-
12 Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, supra note 11, at 704.
is Id. 706-15.
14 Closing procedures are described in Schegloff & Sacks, supra note 11, passim.
[Vol. 129: 1006
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plays his or her understanding of the first speaker's utterance. In
using the option of the turn-taking system to select the next speaker,
a current speaker can produce the first part of an adjacency pair
and thereby not only control who gets the next turn, but also what
he or she will do in that turn.
This is illustrated in the following extract from a transcript
of an actual exchange (equal signs signify no perceivable break
between the two utterances):
C: Andrew do you want to raise any other-
A: =Nothing special thank you no 15
In his turn, C uses an address term ("Andrew' and he asks a
question ("do you want to raise any other="). The address term
is used to specify who is selected to take the next turn, and the
question is used to get an answer from this selected next speaker.
Other means than address terms can be used to indicate the next
speaker, including indexical pronouns, nodding, gazing, or pointing
at the selected party, and features of content or context that imply
who should or should not respond. Additionally, other first parts of
adjacency pairs can control what the selected speaker should do in
his or her turn. For example, a greeting can be used to elicit a
return greeting, an offer to obtain an acceptance or a rejection, a
summons to elicit an acknowledgment, and a request to obtain a
granting or a rejection, to name only a few. Thus, when adjacency
pair organization is used in selecting the next speaker, the current
speaker does not simply alot the next turn to a particular party;
he or she also specifies the action that that selected party should
perform in the turn.
In the exchange just cited, A responds in his turn with an
answer ("Nothing special thank you no"). This shows that he
recognizes that C's utterance was intended as a question. The use
by a first speaker of the first part of an adjacency pair sets up the
expectation that the second speaker will produce the second part
of the same adjacency pair and in so doing will display his recogni-
tion and understanding of the first speaker's intention. This rela-
tionship between the two parts of an adjacency pair is known as
"conditional relevance": A's answer does not merely occur sub-
sequent to C's question; rather, C's question provides for the rel-
evance of A's answer, and A's answer is produced and heard as a
response to C's question.
1 J. ATEINsoN & P. DEEw, supra note 2, at 47.
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The following excerpt also illustrates conditional relevance
(the bracket marks the point at which the second speaker's utterance
overlaps the first speaker's utterance):
B: Why don't you come and see me some [times
A: I would like to' 6
The second speaker's utterance, which begins even before the first
speaker has finished talking, is produced and heard as an accept-
ance ("I would like to"). This is because B's utterance ("Why
don't you come and see me sometimes") is an invitation, and not
really a question asking "why?" A's acceptance displays an under-
standing that B's utterance is an invitation because invitation and
acceptance/rejection are an adjacency pair: an invitation provides
for the relevance of an acceptance (or a rejection), and an accept-
aice is produced and heard as a response to an invitation. Only
if B's utterance were understood as a question would it be relevant
for A to produce an answer, perhaps explaining or giving a reason
why he or she does not go to see B (for example, "I don't come and
see you because . . .").
This example also illustrates another important characteristic
of utterances in conversational turns. A sentence that is literally
interrogative, declarative, or imperative may be used to accomplish
actions other than asking questions, making statements, or issuing
commands. B's utterance, though it has the grammatical structure
of an interrogative sentence, is not used to ask a question, but in-
stead is meant to indirectly issue an invitation. That in verbal
exchanges one action may be done-and be understood to be done-
by way of another action is crucial to an understanding of court-
room examination as a speech exchange system. This point is dis-
cussed below.17
Conditional relevance is particularly apparent in cases in which
second parts of adjacency pairs are not produced. A second part
that does not follow a first part is not merely omitted; because it is
conditionally relevant on the completion of the first part, it is
"officially" or "noticeably" absent. The omission of a second part
is a significant event, which can be interpreted as reticence, shy-
ness, evasiveness, embarrassment, or hostility; it is a failure, a matter
that can be the subject of complaint by the first speaker or other
16 Id. 50.
17 The most important recent philosophical work involving actions done by in-
direction is Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in 3 SYNTAx AND SEmANurcs: SPeecH ACTS
59 (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds. 1975).
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participants. This is evident in a conversation reported to have
occurred among two adult women and the six year-old son and
ten year-old daughter of one of the women. The children enter
.the scene and the following exchange takes place.
Woman: Hi.
-Boy: Hi.
Woman: Hi, Annie.
Mother: Annie, don't you hear someone say hello to you?
Woman: Oh, that's okay, she smiled hello.
Mother: You know you're supposed to greet someone,
don't you?
Annie: [Hangs head] Hello.'
When Annie does not respond to the woman's greeting ("Hi,
Annie"), her silence is treated as the official absence of a return
greeting and is interpreted as the result of shyness or awkwardness;
Annie's mother complains about this failure, the woman offers an
excuse for it, her mother tells her how to rectify it, and finally,
with hanging head, Annie does so by producing the tardy return
greeting.
Although first and second parts (when second parts are pro-
duced) generally occur in immediately juxtaposed turns, in one
type of sequencing a second part does not occur in the immediately
succeeding turn and yet is not heard as officially absent. This
happens when "insertion sequences" occur between first and sec-
ond parts. Insertion sequences may be produced in question and
answer sequencing in conversation and, significantly, in courtroom
examination, as will be described subsequently. In conversation,
a question-answer pair may be inserted between the first and sec-
ond parts of another question-answer pair, as in this example:
A: Are you coming tonight?
B: Can I bring a guest?
A: Sure.
B: I'll be there.19
Here the sequence of turns is not Q-A-Q-A, as is the case when
second parts occur immediately following first parts, but rather
Q-Q-A-A. In this latter sequence, the first question and last answer
comprise an adjacency pair, as do the question and answer that
is Analyzability of Stories, supra note 11, at 341.
19 Conversational Practice, supra note 11, at 78.
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occur between them. This may be represented as Q1-QA-A.
Q2 ("Can I bring a guest?") and A2 ("Sure.") are an insertion
sequence.
Not just any pair can occur as an insertion sequence. An in-
serted pair must follow from and relate to Q, and provide for the
occurrence of Al. It must be "remedial" in the sense that Q2 asks
for a clarification, correction, or repetition of Q, and A2 provides
this requested addition. When the insertion sequence is completed
(and the remedial work has thereby been accomplished), the condi-
tional relevance of A,, which was established by Q,, remains in
effect. A, will, therefore, either be produced or will be heard as
officially absent. That relations of conditional relevance between
the parts of adjacency pairs are maintained when they are separated
by insertion sequences is further documented by conversational
exchanges that contain multiple insertions, that is, sequences in-
serted within sequences that are inserted within sequences, etc. A
sequence of this type, which may be represented as Q-QQQ-
A4-A3-A2-Al, occurs in the following exchange:
A: Are you coming tonight?
B: Can I bring a friend?
A: Male or female?
B: What difference does that make?
A: An issue of balance.
B: Female.
A: Sure.
B: I'll be there.20
Much more could be said about the organization of conversa-
tion, but this sketch should provide a sufficient basis for proceeding
with a discussion of the organization of courtroom examination.
ORGANIZATION OF EXAMINATION
Talk in examination shares a number of the characteristics
specified above for talk in conversation. Single speakers take single
turns and there is a minimum of overlap, which occurs only at
transition relevance places. Turn transfers are effected through
"current speaker selects next" and "self selection" techniques. The
size of turns in an examination is not fixed and the length of an
examination is not specified in advance. Finally, the content of the
talk that fills a turn is not predetermined though, as will be seen,
it is constrained by adjacency pair organization.
20 Id. 79.
[Vol. 129:1006
BOOK REVIEWS
The turn-taking system for examination differs from the system
for conversation in two important respects. First, questions and
answers are the only types of turns that can occur. And second,
they are preallocated, in that only examining parties have the right
to ask questions and only examined parties have the obligation to
answer them. In question and answer sequencing generally, a
speaker who asks a question not only establishes the relevance of an
answer from the person to whom the question is addressed, but he
also reserves for himself the right to self-select the turn following
the answer. Because this self-selected turn can be used to ask
another question, which in turn requires another answer, question-
answer pairs can be chained to produce lengthy Q-A-Q-A-Q-A . . .
sequences.21  Examination is thus a two-party speech exchange
system: talk is ordered as a sequence of question and answer turns
that are preallocated to examining and examined parties, respec-
tively.
Examining counsel and examined witnesses are not, of course,
the only persons who talk during an examination. Judges occa-
sionally self-select and ask a witness a question. When they do,
they temporarily take counsel's place as examining party; their
question is thus not heard as an interruption. On the other hand,
opposing counsel regularly break into the two-party exchanges of
counsel and witness to state objections; these utterances are heard
as interruptions. Objection sequences, which are unique to and
distinctive features of examination, are interruptions in the sense
that they alter the Q-A-Q-A sequencing of counsel and witness, but
they are not violations of the turn-taking organization of examina-
tion. They are specialized insertion sequences, which are initiated
by a third party, opposing counsel. Such an objection, which is
-7d uT siaqtunK "isunoa 2UTsoddo = DO pua :;)pnf = f :ss;u
- =!I  Al -Iasunoa = f :Zap smraxz uopiu!imxa Iaqto liu puu
Squ u1 9si~j; ds ioJ SuofnlEA;iqqV) "uopruiurmxa papioaga adm
u uoi 7dx;3xa Su!MtolloJ 3ip uM sxnno aauanbas uomp:;fqo rV moil
ra xo ;*umdaP uuxpa ~p~dk:)u:)epu itp jo sixed puo:D;9
tp jo auo 3npo:Ed oi uxm sul u! paxinbai si oqM 'a~pnf ;Ip '.aud
ipinoj re xiA-ds ixau s-e si);ps 'aiud Abua:zupe uu lo ixd 39.ii wtp
rentheses note the length, in seconds, of pauses. Dots within pa-
rentheses signify pauses of less than a tenth of a second. Colons
signify a lengthening of the sound they follow. Words in paren-
theses were not clearly audible. Italics represent stressed sounds.)
21 Anylzability of Stories, supra note 11, at 343.
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C: A:nd did you live with anyone?
W: Yes I did.
C: A:nd (.) whom did you live (with)?
W: Ezra Maclean.
C: n who is Ezra Maclean?
(2.2)
oC: 0e)
W: The man I live with
OC: I object to that question.
J: Well (.) er:h I think that uh...2
In this example, opposing counsel initially attempts to state an
objection following counsel's question ("n who is Ezra Maclean?"),
but does not actually state it until after the witness's answer ("The
man I live with"). This points up the fact that objection se-
quences can be initiated following both questions and answers.
As selected next speaker, the judge, after stalling presumably for
time to decide on his ruling, uses his turn to sustain or overrule
the objection and, thereby, complete this objection sequence.
Objection sequences, therefore, are specialized insertion se-
quences initiated during question-answer sequences in examination
in order to remedy legally defined difficulties. What is especially
interesting about objection sequences is that, though they are one
of the few types of exchanges in an examination in which procedural
or evidentiary rules are the focus of concern, they seldom include
any explicit reference to these rules. As is the case in the sequence
just cited, attorneys most often state objections without mentioning
the procedural rule that they are invoking ("I object to that ques-
tion"). Atkinson and Drew suggest two reasons why objections are
generally stated in this way. First, by not explicitly revealing the
grounds for their objections, lawyers avoid exposing any possible
errors in their legal reasoning to public criticism. Second, at the
same time, by not stating grounds, the judge is left free to base
his ruling on whatever grounds for an objection seem to him most
pertinent. The authors do not suggest that legal rules of pro-
cedure therefore explain less about what happens at trial than
would a study of the turn-taking organization of examination.
Rather, their point is that all activities that are accomplished in
examination, including the application of procedural rules, are ac-
complished through question and answer turns that are preallocated
by the turn-taking system of examination.
23
22J. ATmNSOv & P. DREw, supra note 2, at 63-64.
23Id. 209-16.
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As pointed out in the discussion of conversation, questions
and answers may be used to accomplish indirectly many different
actions. Recall this conversational excerpt, which was cited above:
B: Why don't you come and see me some [times
A : tI would like to
Although ostensibly a question-answer sequence, this utterance pair
is actually an invitation-acceptance sequence. In examination, the
accomplishment of all actions is constrained by the question and
answer turn-taking system. Accusations, denials, justifications, ex-
cuses, challenges, and rebuttals are only a few of the actions that
are accomplished in question and answer turns.
An excerpt from an American rape trial in which a challenge-
rebuttal sequence is managed in a sequence of questions and an-
swers can serve to illustrate the indirect accomplishment of activities
in examination. This example is chosen for the sake of brevity;
Atkinson and Drew give much more extensive treatment to accusa-
tion-denial/excuse/justification sequences, but the management of
these actions is too complex for brief summary here.
C: And during that enti:re evening (.) Miss Lebrette (.)
its your testimony (2.3) that there was: (0.9) no indica-
tion as far as you could tell that the defendant had
been drinking.
W: No
(3.1)
C: No Miss Lebrette (1.2) when you were intervie:wed
by the poli:ce sometimes later-sometime later that eve-
ning (1.1) didn't you te:ll the police that the defend-
ant had been drinking (.) [(did you tell them that)
[
W: "No I told them that
there was a coo:ler in the ca:r and that I never opened
it.24
In the first question-answer sequence, counsel challenges the wit-
ness by presenting and receiving confirmation of information, which
he then indicates in his next question is contradicted by other in-
formation. That the witness hears this second question as a chal-
lenge and not merely as a question about her police interview is
suggested by the fact that her answer is a rebuttal-the second part
of a challenge-rebuttal adjacency pair. She attempts to rebut coun-
sel's challenge by showing that no real discrepancy exists between
her testimony and her police statement: she maintains that she
24 Id. 69-72.
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never told the police the defendant had been drinking, only that
there was a cooler in the car. Her reply not only answers counsel's
question but also, more importantly, rebuts his challenge. Both
the challenge and the rebuttal in this sequence are effected indi-
rectly in question and answer turns. As Atkinson and Drew put it,
challenges and rebuttals, like all actions in examination, are "pack-
aged" as questions and answers.
It is evident, then, that the turn-taking organization of exam-
ination operates as a constraint that forces participants to perform
their actions indirectly in the guise of questions and answers. In
addition, it is a constraint that participants in examination use as a
resource in managing their actions. Two examples of counsel's use
of this resource are contained in the following excerpt, which con-
tinues the preceding excerpt.
W: No I told them there was a coo:ler in the ca:r and that
I never opened it=
C: =The answer er: may the (balance) be here stricken
your honour and the answer is no
J: The answer is no
(5.1)
C: We- wz you:r testimony (.) as far as you can conclude
(.) the defendant had not been drinking (.) [(right)
W:L Right
C: n you never told the police that the defendant had
been drinking
(0.6)
W: I told them about the coo:ler
C: You never told the police the defendant had been
dri nking( )
W: *[No 2
In his first turn in this excerpt, counsel uses the question-answer
sequential organization of examination as the basis for lodging a
complaint about the witness's preceding utterance. On the grounds
that the witness should use her turn to provide an answer to his
question and nothing more, he asks the judge to strike all of her
reply except her negative answer to his question ("The answer er:
may the (balance) be here stricken and the answer is no"). In effect,
counsel here uses the turn-taking organization to constrain what
the witness can do in her turn, maintaining that the parts of her
utterance that are designed as a rebuttal to his own challenge should
25 Id. 72-73.
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not be allowed because they are not conditionally relevant parts of
an answer to his question. The judge concurs with counsel's argu-
ment ("The answer is no").
Counsel also invokes the turn-taking organization in his last
turn in this extract. In this instance, his complaint is not that the
witness has done more than answer his question; rather, it is that
she has not answerd his question-that her reply is "nonrespon-
sive." By repeating the question he asked in his immediately pre-
ceding turn ("You never told the police the defendant had been
drinking"), counsel implies that the witness's reply to this question
does not count as an answer. Because an answer is officially absent,
counsel repeats his question in a second attempt to elicit an answer,
the production of which is needed to complete the question-answer
adjacency pair sequencing initiated by his question. Again, coun-
sel uses the turn-taking organization of examination to restrict what
the witness is permitted to do in her turn.
In addition to using the turn-taking organization as a resource
in indirectly managing actions in examination, participants also use
it in conveying unstated implications. Counsel, for example, by
allowing a long pause to occur after a witness's answer, can imply
that special significance attaches to the answer. He can do this
because his question turns and the witness's answer turns are pre-
allocated. Counsel's use of this implicational strategy is apparent
in another extract drawn from the same rape trial from which the
two preceding extracts were taken:
C: You were out in the woods with the defendant at this
point isn't that so?
(1.0)
W: Yeah.
(7.0)
C: And the defendant (.) took (.) the ca:r (1.0) and backed
it (1.0) into some trees didn'e?
(0.5)
W: Mm hm.
C: [underneath some trees (1.5) Now Miss Lebrette
this time did you make any mention about turning
around?
W: No.
(11.0)
C: An it was at this point that you say that the defend-
ant...26
26 Id. 240-41.
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The seven second pause following the witness's positive answer to
counsel's first question and the eleven second pause following her,
negative answer to counsel's third question both imply that the
witness's motives for her participation in the events in question
were not as innocent as she represented. Implications such as these
may be inferred by participants, particularly juries, because turns,
are preallocated in the organization of examination: counsel asks
questions, witnesses produce answers in turns after questions, and
turns after answers revert to counsel. It is because this next ques-
tion turn is preallocated to counsel that gaps between the end of
an answer and the beginning of counsel's next question are pro-
duced and heard as counsel's pauses. In this way, the turn-taking
organization provides counsel with a means of making unspoken
comments on the answers of witnesses. These implicational com-
ments can be conveyed because turns are preallocated in the organi-
zation of examination. Participants in conversation cannot use
pauses to convey such implications because their turns are not pre-
allocated; participants who delay starting a turn in conversation
are likely to lose the turn to faster starting participants.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
As mentioned at the outset, Atkinson and Drew take the posi-
tion that not enough is known about the organization of verbal
interaction in court for proponents of radical reforms to argue that
court procedures should be changed because they mystify and coerce
participants, or for traditionalists to argue that procedures should
not be changed because they facilitate the decision-making tasks
of the court. In their final chapter, the authors return to this issue
and discuss several practical implications of the research described
in the body of their book.2 7 Although they qualify their remarks
as only tentative hints or suggestions because of the preliminary
nature of this research, their recommendations nonetheless appear
to be noteworthy and of considerable potential importance.
Proposals for change and for no change, Atkinson and Drew
argue, are not likely to be realistic unless they take into account
basic features of the organization of courtroom interaction. Rad-
ical proposals urging change in "unpleasant" or "undesirable"
practices that are bewildering, intimidating, or oppressive to par-
ticipants (for example, the placing of judges behind an imposing
27 Id. 217-32.
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raised bench and witnesses in the witness box) may underestimate
the importance of these practices in the accomplishment of court
business. The continuous monitoring of courtroom activities by
all participants requires that speakers be categorized as counsel,
witness, and the rest, and the placement of participants in specific
locations in the courtroom may contribute significantly to this fea-
ture of the organization of court hearings. Conservative recom-
mendations against changes in present practices (for example, the
wearing of gowns, or the use of a gavel or other paraphernalia) may
overestimate the importance of these practices in the organization
of courtroom interaction. Special attire and paraphernalia may
be totally redundant and unnecessary means of categorizing par-
ticipants, inasmuch as their identification is also indicated by their
locations in the courtroom.
Atkinson and Drew suggest that, in addition to being framed
in terms of the general organizational requirements for interaction
in multi-party courtroom settings, proposals either to change or to
perpetuate court procedures should also recognize that there is an
inevitable interrelationship between the organization of communi-
cative activity and the conveyance of moral implications. What
people say and how they say it is always subject to interpretation
by listeners, who infer implications that may or may not have been
intended by the speaker. As just described, counsel sometimes
pause for several seconds after a witness's turn. Other court par-
ticipants interpret these pauses as implying a postive or negative
evaluation of the witness's answer-that he or she is telling the
truth and being cooperative or lying and being evasive. It could
be that a reform measure might be proposed to eliminate lengthy
counsel pauses on the ground that, like hearsay evidence and ac-
counts of past convictions, these pauses are prejudicial to the de-
fendant's case and, therefore, inadmissible in examination. Be-
cause, however, the implicational force of counsel pauses derives
from the preallocation of question-answer turns in the organization
of examination, the only way these implications could be eliminated
from examination would be by replacing question-answer se-
quencing with another type of sequential organization. Such an
alternative organizational arrangement for examination would not
necessarily be an improvement, however. It might or might not
operate as effectively as preallocated question-answer turns in man-
aging the accomplishment of courtroom interactional tasks. And
even if it should be as efficient as the question-answer system, this
new organization-like all organizations of communicative activity
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-would also allow for the production of utterances that are open
to moral assessment,
The practical implications of Atkinson and Drew's recom-
mendations are profound, to say the least. It is no small matter to
suggest that proposals for changing or perpetuating court pro-
cedures should be evaluated not only in terms of how adequately
they deal with the basic organizational requirements of courtroom
interaction, but also in terms of how carefully they consider the
different moral implications that are communicated on the basis
of alternative turn-taking organizations. How verbal interaction
is organized and how moral implications are conveyed in the court-
room are topics that have not received much research attention
and that are not yet well understood. Atkinson and Drew's book,
which is devoted primarily to courtroom data analyses, many of
which are much more subtle and complex than the examples re-
counted here, is a pioneering contribution to this area of research.
It breaks important new ground and points the way for further
study. It can only be hoped that the fundamental research reorien-
tation recommended by Atkinson and Drew will provide guidance
for a great deal of future research, and that this research eventually
will provide a sound basis for framing proposals for and against
alterations in courtroom procedures.
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BERNARD G. SEGAL
The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review take
great pleasure in dedicating this issue to Bernard G. Segal of the
Class of 1931, the first time this honor has been conferred on a
practicing attorney. Throughout his distinguished legal career-
from his tenure as Case Editor of Volume 79 of the Law Review to
his current position as Chairman of the law firm of Schnader,
Harrison, Segal & Lewis-Mr. Segal has demonstrated an unprece-
dented dedication and commitment to the legal community and to
the Law School. The remarks of the distinguished contributors to
this dedication reflect the great respect that Mr. Segal's accomplish-
ments have inspired in his friends and colleagues.
